Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2020-2021

Article 7

September 2020

U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass'n.
Taylor A. Simpson
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, taylor1.simpson@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Simpson, Taylor A. (2020) "U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass'n.," Public Land &
Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss13/7

This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n.,
140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020)
Taylor Simpson
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the United
States Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, a company who
planned to construct a natural gas pipeline under a section of the
Appalachian National Scenic Trail within the George Washington
National Forest. The legal battle sought to clarify whether the United
States Forest Service had the authority to grant the pipeline builder a rightof-way across the Appalachian Trail. The Court ruled that the National
Park Service holds an easement for administering the Appalachian Trail,
but the land over which the trail crosses remains under the jurisdiction of
the Forest Service. Therefore, under the Mineral Leasing Act, the Forest
Service had the authority to grant Atlantic Coast Pipeline a pipeline rightof-way under the Appalachian Trail.
I. INTRODUCTION
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (“Atlantic”) cleared a major legal
challenge to the construction of a 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West
Virginia to North Carolina.1 The legal challenge centered on a 0.1-mile
section of pipeline that would traverse 600 feet under the Appalachian
National Scenic Trail (“AT”) as part of a sixteen mile section crossing the
George Washington National Forest.2 Atlantic obtained permits from the
United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”), including a right-of-way
for the 0.1-mile AT segment.3 The issue in the case was whether the Forest
Service had the authority to grant the right-of-way for the section of
pipeline that crossed the AT.4 Under the Mineral Leasing Act (“Leasing
Act”), federal agencies can grant pipeline rights-of-way on all federal
lands except for national park land.5 The National Park Service (“Park
Service”), not the Forest Service, administers the AT, a national scenic
trail in the National Trail System.6 The Court held that even though the
Park Service administers the AT, the land over which the trail passes is
not part of the National Park System. Therefore, the Forest Service had the
authority, under the Leasing Act, to grant Atlantic its right-of-way.7
Shortly after this decision, Atlantic decided to cancel construction
of the pipeline, citing legal uncertainties facing the project as well as its

1.
U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct.
1837, 1841 (2020).
2.
Id. at 1841–42.
3.
Id. at 1842.
4.
Id. at 1843–44.
5.
Id. at 1843.
6.
Id. at 1841.
7.
Id.
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ballooning costs from lawsuits.8 Lawsuits reportedly increased the cost of
the pipeline from $4.5 billion to $8 billion.9
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Passed in 1920, the Leasing Act gave the Secretary of the Interior
the power to grant pipeline rights-of-way through public lands.10 This Act
was further amended in 1973 to allow other agency heads the same
power.11 The 1973 amendments defined “public lands” as “all lands owned
by the United States, except lands in the National Park System, lands held
in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe, and lands on the Outer Continental
Shelf.”12 Congress had previously defined the National Parks System in
1970 as “any area of land and water now and hereafter administered by the
Secretary of Interior, through the National Park Service for park,
monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”13 This
carve-out means that companies cannot rely on the Leasing Act for a rightof-way for a potential pipeline crossing national park land.14
Enacted in 1968, the National Trails Systems Act (“Trails Act”)
established a system of national scenic and historic trails.15 The Trails Act
gives administrative responsibilities for the AT to the Secretary of the
Interior, who delegated these responsibilities to the National Park
Service.16 In 2015, Atlantic began the permitting process for a 604-mile
natural gas pipeline that would run from West Virginia to North
Carolina.17 This proposed route included a sixteen-mile segment through
the George Washington National Forest with a 0.1-mile section crossing
under the AT. Because the pipeline crossed national forest land, Atlantic
needed specific use permits from the Forest Service as well as a right-ofway for the 0.1-mile AT segment.18 The Forest Service granted these
permits in 2018.19 Cowpasture River Preservation Association,
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network,
Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia
(“Respondents”) filed a petition for review, after exhausting all
administrative appeals, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
8.
Ivan Penn, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Canceled as Delays and Costs
Mount, NEW YORK TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/
business/atlantic-coast-pipeline-cancel-dominion-energy-berkshire-hathaway.html.
9.
Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast
Pipeline, DOMINION ENERGY (July 5, 2020), https://news.dominionenergy.com/202007-05-Dominion-Energy-and-Duke-Energy-Cancel-the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline.
10.
Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 140 S. Ct. at 1843.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2018)).
13.
Id. (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2018)).
14.
Id. at 1853.
15.
Id. at 1843 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a) (2018)).
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 1841.
18.
Id. at 1842.
19.
Id.
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Fourth Circuit. The Respondents contended that the pipeline right-of-way
granted to Atlantic to cross under the AT was a violation of the Leasing
Act.20 Atlantic intervened.21
The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of Respondents, holding that the
Forest Service did not have the statutory authority to grant pipeline rightsof-way across the AT pursuant to the Leasing Act.22 The court found that
the AT was a part of the National Park System because administrative
duties had been delegated to the National Park Service.23 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that because the AT was part of the National
Park System, it was “beyond the authority of ‘the Secretary of the Interior
or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights-of-way.”24 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the Forest Service
could grant a right-of-way for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline to cross the
AT.25
III. ANAYLSIS
The Court analyzed multiple interacting federal laws including the
Leasing Act and the National Trails Systems Act, and issues pertaining to
federalism and private property rights.
A. National Trails as Easements
The Forest Service and the Park Service entered into a right-ofway agreement for the 780 miles of the AT that traverses national forest
land in 1971.26 Respondents argued that this right-of-way agreement
converted the federal land beneath the AT into National Park System land,
and under the Leasing Act, a pipeline cannot cross federal land within the
National Park System without congressional authorization.27 The Court
rejected this argument by relying on basic property law principles and
legislative history.28 Citing contemporary cases and definitions, the Court
defined a right-of-way as a type of easement granting a limited “‘right to
pass . . . through the estate of another.’”29
Around the time the Trails Act was enacted, courts acknowledged
that rights-of-way only gave nonpossessory rights, and that the grantor of

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
(4th ed. 1968)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018)).
Id.
Id. at 1841.
Id. at 1844.
Id. at 1848.
Id. at 1845–46.
Id. at 1844 (quoting Right-of-way, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489
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the right-of-way retained full ownership of “the land itself.”30 The Court
opined that if a private land owner granted a right-of-way to a private
company for a pipeline, “no one would think” the company now owned
the land.31 Relying on this logic and the absence of contrary language in
the Trails Act, the Court reasoned that Congress would not attach two
different meanings to the “‘same term in the same statute’” and grant a
more expansive meaning for federal agencies.32 Based on these
definitions, the Court applied a basic principle of property law: “easements
are not land, they merely burden land that continues to be owned by
another.”33
The Court held that the Park Service holds an easement for the
purpose of creating and administering the AT, but “the land itself remains
under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.”34 This means that the AT falls
outside the 1970 definition of National Park System land.35 Therefore, the
AT was national forest land, not national park land, and the Forest Service
could grant Atlantic’s pipeline right-of-way under the Leasing Act.36
B. Congressional Intent and Private Property Concerns
To determine whether the AT was part of the National Park
System, the Court examined similar legislation to the Trails Act to further
understand and apply Congress’s intent. These other statutes, when
intending to transfer land between agencies, used “unequivocal and direct
language” to do so.37 The Court compared the language in the Trails Act
to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act38—enacted the same day as the Trails
Act.39 When drafting Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Congress explicitly said
“any component of the national wild and scenic rivers system that is
administered by the Secretary of Interior through the National Park
Service shall become a part of the National Park System.”40 The Court
reasoned that if Congress intended for the land the AT crosses to become
part of the National Park System, the Trails Act would have used similarly
explicit language.41 Instead, Congress used terms of rights-of-ways,
implying it did not intend for a land transfer for national trails.42

30.
Id. at 1844 (citing Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d
786, 789 (Minn. 1970)).
31.
Id. at 1847.
32.
Id. (quoting Azar v. Allina Health Services, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812
(2019)).
33.
Id. at 1845.
34.
Id. at 1846.
35.
Id. at 1848.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 1847.
38.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2018).
39.
Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. at 1847.
40.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c)).
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
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The Court also warned that finding for the Respondents would
entail a massive expansion of power to the Department of Interior (“DOI”)
without express consent from Congress.43 The AT encompasses 58,110.94
acres of non-federal land including 8,815.98 acres of private land.44 Under
Respondents’ argument, the DOI could expand the Park Service’s
jurisdiction by delegating administrative responsibilities to the Park
Service.45 According to the Court, this would mean that all trails
administered by the Park Service, or other lands delegated for
administrative purposes, would be part of the National Park System.46 The
Court expressed concern for both issues in federalism and private property
rights resulting from such an expansion in Park Service jurisdiction.47
Under Respondents’ argument, the Court opined that all of this non-federal
and private land would also fall under the jurisdiction of the Park
Service.48 The Court, citing its own precedent, stated that “when Congress
wishes to ‘alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,’ . . . we
would expect it to speak with the requisite clarity to place that intent
beyond dispute.”49 The Court refused to presume the delegation process
expanded Park Service jurisdiction without “clear congressional
command.”50
The Court looked to the 1911 Weeks Act to support an absence of
clear congressional command.51 The Weeks Act, which established the
George Washington National Forest, provides that lands acquired for the
National Forest System “shall be permanently reserved, held, and
administered as national forest lands.”52 The Court concluded that the
Trails Act must be read in conjunction with the Weeks Act, specifically
pointing to the above language.53 The Court further highlighted language
from the Trails Act that states, “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall
be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management
responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered
lands which are components of the National Trails System.”54 The Court
reasoned that these two provisions, the use of the term “right-of-way” in
the Trails Act, and the administrative duties laid out by the Trails Act,
further demonstrate a lack of congressional intent for such a vast
expansion of the Park Service’s jurisdiction.55
43.
Id. at 1849.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 1848.
46.
Id. at 1849.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S.
457, 468 (2001)).
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 1842; 16 U.S.C. § 521 (2018).
52.
Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. at 1842 (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 521).
53.
Id. at 1850.
54.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A) (2018)).
55.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the
Interior’s delegation of overall administration of the AT did not transform
the land over which the trail passes into part of the National Park System.56
Therefore, under the Leasing Act, the Forest Service had the authority to
grant Atlantic’s pipeline right-of-way.57 The Court relied heavily on its
analysis of congressional intent as well as public policy considerations
regarding federalism and private property rights.
Despite this legal victory for Atlantic, the company stopped
construction of the pipeline, citing legal uncertainties surrounding its
future.58 However, Atlantic may sell its vast amounts of natural gas storage
and transmission pipelines to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, who would
also assume Atlantic’s $5.7 billion of debt, casting further doubt on the
future of the pipeline.59
Regardless of the future of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, the Court
has now set a legal precedent. The twenty-one national historic and scenic
trails that the Park Service administers are not part of the National Park
System. Consequentially, the agencies, states, and private landowners that
granted rights-of-way for these trails ultimately retain jurisdiction and
ownership of those lands. For all national historic and scenic trails that are
on federal land, the agencies who have jurisdiction over the burdened land
now have the full authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under the
Mineral Leasing Act.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Dominion Energy, supra note 9.
Penn, supra note 8.

